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dict prior to her death and the curator had filed a provisional
account (including a doctor's bill) which was approved and
homologated by the district court. This account was not rendered contradictorily with anyone, nobody had been notified,
there was no proof and no hearing. Such an account is not res
judicata, and did not interrupt the prescription which ran
against part of the doctor's claim for services. A minority of
the court would have granted a rehearing to consider whether
there had been a suspension of the running of time between the
start of the interdiction suit and the appointment of a curator.
This is not mentioned expressly in the official opinion of the
court, but a negative answer is necessarily implicit. The prescription in this case was running against the doctor and not
against the interdict, but since there is so little material on
this particular point, it would have been useful to have a good
discussion and open treatment of the question whether during
this period the doctor had any avenue of recourse which he had
failed to exercise.

MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES

Implied Covenants
Kimbrough v. Atlantic Refining Co.1 raises the question of
the applicability of the implied covenant of diligent development
under an agreement compromising a dispute over lease development. One producing well had been drilled on plaintiffs' lease.
As a result of a demand for further development a compromise
agreement was executed. Defendant lessee agreed to release all
but ninety acres of the leased tract. The agreement also provided that lessee would be free of further development obligations, except to protect against drainage, and that the lease
would remain in force as to the retained acreage "so long as pro'2
duction is being obtained from said tract.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 152 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
2. The pertinent portion of the agreement in question reads as follows: "In
consideration for the partial release so granted by Atlantic, lessors acknowledge
that said mineral leases are and shall remain in full force and effect insofar as

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

The original well had been producing a rim of oil under
pressure from a gas cap. When it became clear that the oil rim
was about to be depleted, the Commissioner of Conservation
established a unit with boundaries including only part of the retained tract, reclassified the sand as a gas sand, and designated
a well at the top of the structure as the unit well. The original
well was shut in upon depletion of the oil rim, and it is clear
that continued production from it would have resulted in improper withdrawal of the gas cap, damaging chances for optimum recovery. Lessors received their full share of royalty
from the unit well.
Plaintiffs brought suit for cancellation of the lease as to the
acreage outside the unit, contending that there was no producing well on the premises as contemplated by the agreement and
there had been no further development in accordance with
lessee's implied obligation.
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held that the compromise agreement did not require that production maintaining
the lease as to the retained acreage be from a well located on
the lease premises but only that there be production from the
tract. Under R.S. 30:10A(1) (b) 3 that portion of production
allocated to a tract included in a forced unit is considered as
having been produced from a well thereon. Therefore, reasoned
the court, lessee being subject to no other development obligation under the terms, of the agreement, the production in question maintained the lease on the retained acreage in its entirety.
The court added that even if the agreement required production
from a well physically located on the tract, unit production
would still constitute production from the tract and would relieve defendant of any development obligation, citing Delatte v.
Woods, 4 Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 5 and Landry v. Flaitz.6 Writs
the retained tract described in the preceding paragraph is concerned so long as
production is being obtained from said tract or Atlantic is conducting operations
in an effort to restore such production pursuant to the terms of said contract;
and it is agreed specifically by lessors that Atlantic shall be free of any development demands or obligation in connection with the tract so retained under the
terms of said leases and, therefore, shall not be required to drill any additional
wells on said tract, unless the drilling of such additional well may be required
to comply with the offset requirements of said leases." Kimbrough v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 152 So. 2d 412, 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
3. LA. R.S. 30:10A(1) (B) (1950) : "The portion of the production allocated
to the owner of each tract included in a drilling suit formed by a pooling order
shall, when produced be considered as if it had been produced from his tract by a
well drilled thereon."
4. 232 La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957).
5. 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 281 (1947).
6. 148 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). This decision was later reversed
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were refused by the Supreme Court with the notation: "The
result is correct."7
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances
the entirety of a lease containing no Pugh Clause is maintained
by production from a unit well, even though it is located off the
leased premises.8 Applicability of this principle was questioned
by lessor in this case on the ground that the compromise agreement waiving further development was executed with reference
to a well on the retained acreage. From this it was reasoned
that to maintain the lease without obligation to further develop
the retained tract, production had to be from a well located on
the premises.
From the facts it appears that the unit well was established
to complete production of the horizon known and contemplated
by the parties at the time of their agreement. Therefore, the
holding that under the agreement production from the unit well
maintained the lease without need of further development seems
correct. The production, legally speaking, is as if it came from
the original well. Extraction through the unit well is solely for
good engineering purposes.
Despite the correctness of the decision on its specific facts,
there is a danger that similar agreements might be construed
in the future to have waived the diligent development obligation as to all sands. Suppose that the unit established by the
Commissioner had been for a sand different from that originally being produced and had included only one or two acres of the
retained area. Would the implied covenant be inoperative? It
seems that it should not. It is true in such a case that the production involved is, legally, "production from the tract." However, it is from a sand not known and not within contemplation
of the parties at the time of the execution of their agreement.
Therefore, the development obligation should not be read out of
the lease as to newly discovered sands.
This decision should
prudence as to diligent
is sometimes the case,
involving new sands.

not be held to
development,
nor should it
Nevertheless,

limit the established jurisor further exploration, as
be extended to situations
the result suggests that

by the Supreme Court, 157 So. 2d 892 (La. 1963).

7. 244 La. 666, 153 So. 2d 882 (1963).
8. LeBlane v. Danciger Oil Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950) ; Hunter

Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
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those drafting or entering into agreements of this kind may
have to be specific about the extent of any waiver of the development obligation in order to protect against possible misconstruction of the instrument.
McDonald v. Grande Corp.9 presents two interesting problem areas: determination of what acts or events will terminate
a declared unit, and the duty of fair dealing between lessee and
lessor. Plaintiff appealed from a summary judgment denying
his demand for cancellation of a mineral lease held by defendant. Under the pooling clause, defendant had formed a 160 acre
unit, concomitantly executing an operating agreement with
other working interest owners in the unit. Drilling operations
resulted in a dry hole.
Subsequently the lessees in the unit terminated their operating agreement. Under the terms of unrecorded instruments effecting this termination, 10 each lessee could apparently drill his
own tract and retain the entire working interest share of production. In the event defendant drilled its tract, it was obligated to pay royalty to all of the lessors in the previously declared unit. However, there was no reciprocal obligation on the
part of the other lessees to make payment to plaintiff in the
event there were successful drilling operations on any of their
own tracts.
Defendant ultimately drilled a producing well on plaintiff's
property. Division orders were circulated showing participation
among the royalty owners according to the unit declaration.
Plaintiff refused to sign, contending that the well was a "lease"
well and that he was entitled to all of the lessor's share of production. Demand for payment was made on defendant lessee and
refused. Plaintiff sued for cancellation.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment stemmed from
the fact that plaintiff had demanded only cancellation. Defendant urged that as the law in Louisiana is unclear concerning
the termination of units of this kind, it acted in good faith in
refusing to make payment of the entire lessor's share of royalties to plaintiff.
9. 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writs denied, 244 La. 128, 150
So.2d 588 (1962).
10. The statement that these documents were unrecorded deserves some clarification in that they were ultimately recorded, but only approximately ten and
one-half months after their execution and six weeks after institution of suit by
plaintiff.
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Plaintiff made two arguments against defendant's contention that its good faith should prevent cancellation. The declaration had recited that it was executed in part for the purpose of
securing "to each of the parties hereto its fair share of the gas
and gas condensates produced from the unitized property."
Upon disclosure of the fact that part of the unitized acreage was
unproductive, plaintiff argued, the unit was obviously terminated, and lessee was therefore arbitrary in failing to meet the
demand for payment. The court of appeal tentatively rejected
this argument, stating that "it is probable that he [plaintiff]
would not be entitled to the relief sought, since we could not say
that the lessee acted in clear violation of the terms of the
lease.""
Plaintiff's second argument was that defendant had viewed
the unit as terminated insofar as its own interest was concerned
and had thus dealt unfairly with plaintiff's interest in executing the unrecorded instruments outlined above.
The court noted the fact that the unrecorded agreements
provided for payment of the lessor's share of royalties according to the unit declaration only if production were achieved from
operations by defendant on plaintiff's property. Although the
lessors of other tracts were protected, defendant had failed to
procure similar protection for its own lessor. Judge Tate saw
this failure to extricate the lessor from a unit evidently considered uneconomic from the lessee's standpoint as a possible
breach of an implied obligation or duty of fair dealing legally
imposed upon the lessee. Prior decisions involving exercise of
the pooling power 1 2 were interpreted as establishing the principle that exercise of that power is subject to "such restrictions
as will prevent arbitrary and unfair dealings and as will therefore enforce a 'standard of good faith' on the part of mineral
lessee."' 3 The lessee operates under a duty to exercise the power
to secure the greatest possible ultimate return to the landowner,
and it must act with the good faith intention of serving lessorlandowner's interest, or at least must refrain from acting to his
detriment.
As pointed out in this survey last year, there is increasing
11. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
12. Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corp., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957) ;
Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956) ; Wilcox
v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
13. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441, 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. (1962).
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utilization of what might be termed a fiduciary principle in oil
and gas law. 1 4 This case, in essence, appears to take note of
the fact that the pooling power is in the nature of a mandate or
agency and therefore requires that a lessee deal with his lessor's
interest accordingly. As the case is not yet finally decided, however, no extended commentary is appropriate.
Express Clauses
Greene v. Carter Oil Co.'5 involves interpretation of a lease
containing a clause stipulating that for the computation of
"rentals and royalties based upon acreage" the tract "shall be
deemed to comprise exactly 82.5 acres whether there actually be
more or less." The leased acreage was included in two separate
drilling and production units. The third party purchaser of the
unit production circulated division orders showing plaintiff's
participation figures based upon a total acreage in the tract of
70.24 acres. Plaintiff refused to sign the division orders and
also rejected a formal tender by the purchaser on that acreage
basis, contending that he should be paid royalties according to
the stipulated figure.
Initially, the court pointed out that as plaintiff had sought
only cancellation of the lease, it might be that the case could be
disposed of solely upon a question of whether a good faith dispute existed between lessor and lessee.' 6 However, the court
deemed it best to render a decision on the issues presented.
Accordingly, it was decided that the royalty payments should
be made on the basis of the actual acreage included in the two
units. In reaching its -conclusion the court viewed the phrase
"royalty based upon acreage," used in fixing the estimated acreage figure in the granting clause, as being synonymous with and
referring to "acreage-based royalty" in the shut-in and force
majeure clauses and the various references thereto in other
parts of the lease. Thus, these "royalties based on acreage" were
distinguished from production royalties.
The court's decision is clearly consistent with the general
14. Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-62 Term - Mineral
Rights, 23 LA. L. REv. 247, 338 n. 48 (1963).
15. 152 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs denied, 244 La. 621, 153
So. 2d 414 (1963).
16. Green v. Carter Oil Co., 152 So. 2d 611, 615 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
Bolin, J., concurred in the result but dissented on the ground that the case
should have been disposed of because of the presence of a good faith dispute
between lessor and lessee, 152 So. 2d 611, 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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intent of this type of stipulated acreage figure. It provides a
fixed basis for payment of delay rentals, shut-in payments and
similar payments computed purely on a per acre basis which
may have to be made to maintain the lease in force. Particularly
in the case of delay rentals, these payments may have to be
made at a time when there has been no survey of the leased
premises and the exact acreage is unknown. The stipulated figure avoids any possible argument as to the correctness of rental
or other payments because of a mistake in determination or lack
of any information concerning exact acreage.
Production royalties, however, represent a share of production or its economic value and are subject to exact measurement
upon extraction. The fact that the lessor's share of production
had to be computed by use of an acreage figure does not change
the nature of the royalty; it is merely a necessary element in
calculating the amount of lessor's share of the product. Where
geological, geophysical, and engineering data permit, unit participation is often calculated on a volumetric basis. Use of an
acreage factor is simply another method of computing the volume of product belonging to lessor.
Landry v. Flaitz, decided within the past term by the First
Circuit, 17 has since been reversed by the Supreme Court.' 8 Therefore, the latter opinion is discussed. Approximately two months
prior to termination of defendant's lease, a well offsetting plaintiff's property was completed by another operator as an oil producer and shut in. As a condition of the permit for this well
it was provided that no allowable would be issued for it until
formation of a unit in accordance with Statewide Order #29-E.
One day before expiration of the primary term, a unit was
formed including a portion of the leased acreage. An allowable
was applied for and secured one week after the expiration date,
effective two days after the expiration date.
Defendant lessee was contending that issuance of the conservation order establishing the unit including part of the lease
maintained it in force. The court, consistently with prior decisions, 9 held that the order did not satisfy the requirement of the
17. 148 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
18. 157 So. 2d 892 (La. 1963).
19. Cases cited by the court were Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d
558 (1962) and Cox v. Acme Land & Investment Co., 192 La. 688, 188 So. 742
(1939). A more direct holding on this point, however, is Smith v. Sun Oil Co.,
172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931). None of these cases involved directly the effect
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habendum clause that there be production at termination of the
lease to extend it beyond the primary term. This result would,
of course, have followed in Louisiana even if the oil well had
been on the leased premises-unless the shut-in clause were made
20
applicable to both oil and gas wells.

Defendant further argued that the condition of the drilling
permit prohibiting issuance of an allowable until establishment
of a unit constituted a force majeure under the terms of the
lease, precluding production for a period running beyond the expiration date because of necessary administrative delays in forming the unit and securing an allowable. The record seems quite
clear that the delays involved in applying for a hearing, awaiting
an order, and then requesting an allowable were necessary administrative delays and that formation of the unit and obtaining
an allowable had been carried out with diligence on the part of
those in interest.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected defendant's argument,
relying heavily on a conservation official's testimony that a temporary unit could have been formed in this instance and a temporary allowable secured at any time within twenty-four hours
after completion and shutting in of the well. Therefore, it was
held that there was no obstacle to production and thus no force
majeure.
This decision is certainly one which could have fallen to
either party. One cannot quarrel with the court's opinion,
though it is a hard one for the lessee. This is a situation in
which no development had taken place on the lease during the
three years of its primary term, and lessee was attempting to
take advantage of a well drilled off the premises to extend his
lease. The decision is, therefore, harmonious with similar prior
cases in which the court has been quite strict with lessees attempting to extend their leases by exercise of the pooling
1
power.

2

It should be observed that if the factual situation in this case
of a conservation order establishing a unit including part of the acreage subject
to lease. However, it seems that this situation should be no different from the
location of a shut-in oil well on the premises. Although the area of the lease
included in the unit constitutes a "developed area" under LA. R.S. 9B (1950),
this fact does not satisfy the requirement of production under the habendum
clause.
20. Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
21. See, for example, Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corp., 232 La. 157, 94
So. 2d 16 (1957) ; Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
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had not permitted issuance of a temporary allowable, there is
at least a basis for implication that the force majeure argument
would have been successful.
Wehran v. Helis22 contains three lease interpretations which
may be briefly noted. First, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal construed a lease providing for a primary term running
"from" the date of execution as excluding the date of execution
from computation of the term.
Second, the operation of a dredge over the well site was
deemed not to constitute thei placing of materials to be used in
drilling the well on the premises. Thus, operations were not
commenced within the meaning of the lease by presence of the
dredge. This holding suggests that lease draftsmen might revise their definitions of "commencement of operations" to meet
the peculiar requirements of waterbottom operations.
The third issue was raised by a drilling clause providing for
continuation of the lease beyond the primary term in this manner: "If at the expiration of the primary term, oil, gas or other
mineral is not being produced ... but lessee is then engaged in
drilling or reworking operations . . . or lessee shall have abandoned a dry hole thereon, or production previously had on the
premises shall have ceased for any cause, within sixty days prior
to the end of the primary term." Lessor contended that this
clause required that drilling operations be initiated more than
sixty days from the end of the primary term to extend the lease
by that means. Despite the fact that the phrase "within sixty
days prior to the end of the primary term" was set off by a
comma from the disjunctive series which preceded it, which
lessor argued indicated an intent that it modify all elements of
the series, the court refused to accept lessor's interpretation. The
provision that the lease was to continue beyond term if lessee
was "then" engaged in drilling was deemed to negate the lessor's
argument. This is consistent with the plain meaning of the
clause; indulgence in technicalities would have avoided the intent of the parties in this instance.
In Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Gulf Coast Drilling & ExplorationCo., 23 plaintiff sublessor was seeking damages from its
23. 154 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), writs denied, 245 La. 68, 156
So.2d 606 (1963).
22. 152 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). A prior appeal on other grounds
was dismissed, 147 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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sublessee for failure to maintain a lease in force in accordance
with their sublease agreement. Loss of the lease, which contained a Pugh Clause, had resulted from failure to pay the full
amount of delay rentals due on a part of the sublet acreage. Despite the fact that defendant was clearly responsible for payment of rentals under its sublease agreement, plaintiff's demand
was rejected. The record disclosed that plaintiff had advised
defendant of the method to be utilized in computing the delay
rentals and on two occasions, including the one resulting in loss
of the lease, had made the rental payment to the lessor for the
account of defendant. The error in computation resulted from
failure to correct the rental figure after reduction in the size of
a conservation unit containing a part of the sublet acreage.
The First Circuit properly held that plaintiff's participation
in making the rental payments coupled with its knowledge of
the conservation order precluded it from fixing legal responsibility for loss of the lease on defendant. The conduct of the parties in administering the contract constituted a pattern of conduct which made the obligation to pay rental a joint responsibility of sublessor and sublessee, despite the express provisions
of the sublease. Defendant's demand for damages against plaintiff was similarly rejected.
Sharpe v. Jenkins 24 provides an interesting comparison with

26
Davis v. Laster,25 discussed in detail in last year's symposium.

Plaintiff executed a sand and gravel lease in favor of defendant
which provided that "the term of this lease shall be for a period
of one year, and lessee shall have the option of annually renewing said lease for a period of four years, provided that lessee
notifies lessor in writing 30 days prior to the expiration of said
lease each year that he renews this lease that he is exercising
his option to renew it, and further provided that if at any time
lessee is removing sand, gravel or clay gravel in paying quantities that this lease shall automatically continue as long as the
production is had in paying quantities."
Both parties continued to treat the property as leased after
the initial term. Plaintiff continued to receive rentals or royalties resulting from defendant's operations. Plaintiff later gave
notice to vacate. He then sought possession by rule, claiming
24. 157 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
25. 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
26. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-62
Mineral Rights, 23 LA. L. REv. 246, 340-48 (1963).

Term -
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that the maximum term of the lease was five years, that a tacit
reconduction had taken place on a month to month basis, and
that he was entitled to possession of the lease.
Reading the habendum clause as a whole, the First Circuit
felt that the parties had executed a lease with a maximum term
of five years, the provision for maintenance by production in
paying quantities constituting only a substitute mode of continuation in lieu of giving notice prior to each anniversary date.
Reliance was also placed on the rule that leases drawn by one
party, in this instance the lessee, shall be construed against such
party. It was held that a tacit reconduction had occurred on a
month to month basis and that plaintiff was entitled to possession as he had complied with the formal requirements of article
470 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Recognizing that it is "one man's opinion," it is respectfully
suggested that the intent of the habendum clause in this instance
was to make this lease conform to the "unless" type of oil and
gas lease, providing for a primary term with extension by production in paying quantities. Still, there is an ambiguity, and
the court's opinion is not without foundation.
The comparison suggested initially, however, is that in Davis
v. Laster,27 the Louisiana Supreme Court utilized the conduct of
the parties to an oil and gas lease as an indication of their own
interpretation of its meaning and held them to the pattern established by their conduct. In the instant case, no weight was
given to the fact that the parties continued to treat the property
as leased after the term of the lease expired. This pattern of
conduct might as easily be construed as evidence of the parties'
mutual understanding of their ambiguously drawn contract as
the basis of a tacit reconduction.
The decision is not, however, one which works great violence
to the law. It does give warning to those drafting similar instruments in the future.
UNITIZATION AGREEMENTS

Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion ParishSchool Board28 required interpretation of the Erath unitization and operating agreements
for the purpose of calculating participation shares in newly dis27. 232 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962).
28. 244 La. 408, 152 So. 2d 541 (1963).
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covered productive areas. Participation figures were established volumetrically at the time of unitization. Difficulty arose
from the fact that the newly discovered sand underlay only a
portion of the unitized area. The court of appeal had ordered
that participation be calculated on a volumetric basis, but that
it be limited to the acreage directly overlying the new sand.
The Supreme Court agreed that the agreement contemplated
a recalculation of participation figures to take'into account the
volume of the discovered reserves. However, it required that all
interests in the unit be allowed to participate. Thus, the volume
of the new reserves was added to the total unit volume and
credit was given to the tracts overlying the reserves for the increase in volume of hydrocarbons beneath them.
Under the agreements in question, the decision of the court
seems correct. As it is merely a question of construction, the
decision is not of great importance. It does, however, present
the attorney with one more problem which must be considered
and perhaps given some drafting solution where possible.
DRILLING CONTRACTS

Duncan Drilling & Well Servicing Co. v. Robinson Research,
Inc.2 9 is noteworthy because of its interpretation of a standard
drilling contract. Plaintiff contractor was seeking the balance
of his drilling contract price, lien costs, and attorney's fees.
The evidence disclosed that plaintiff had lost circulation in
the process of drilling, causing a blowout. No blowout preventer
had been furnished. After bringing the well under control and
reconditioning the hole, drilling operations were resumed. Loss
of circulation was again experienced. On defendant's order the
well was completed at approximately one-third the contract
depth.
Plaintiff urged that he had complied with the contract and
the repeated loss of circulation constituted an abnormally difficult and hazardous condition for which he was not responsible.
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that failure of normal
completion resulted from plaintiff's breach of contract in neglecting to equip the rig with a blowout preventer and to maintain on hand and readily available an adequate supply of control
29. 147 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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Defendant reconvened for damages for breach of

The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that plaintiff had
breached his contract by failing to furnish a blowout preventer
and maintain an adequate supply of control materials. He was,
therefore, responsible for the failure to reach contract depth.
General provisions of the contract required that plaintiff perform with "due diligence and care and in a good and workmanlike manner" and that he maintain well control equipment in
good condition and usei all reasonable means to control and prevent fires and blowouts and protect the hole.
Plaintiff maintained that these general provisions of the
contract were modified by the "Specifications and Special Provisions" attached to the contract, one clause of which was entitled "Equipment, Materials and Services to be Furnished by
Contractor." The blanks containing specifications for rig equipment, including a blowout preventer, were not filled out in the
disputed contract. Therefore, plaintiff contended that he was
not required to furnish a blowout preventer and could not be
held responsible for the events which occurred.
The court rejected this argument, however, pointing out that
none of the specifications for rig equipment had been filled out.
That being so, plaintiff could as easily have contended that he
was "not required to furnish engines or any other items of
equipment which would be absolutely essential to the operation
of the rig. 30 Thus, the court felt that the general provisions of
the contract were controlling. Under the circumstances of the
case the use of a blowout preventer and other well control equipment constituted "reasonable means" for preventing the difficulties encountered.
The court also noted, and apparently gave some effect to
Statewide Order No. 29-B of the Department of Conservation,
which requires the use of blowout preventers. A petroleum inspector for the department testified that he had no authority to
relax these provisions of the order.
In rejecting plaintiff's demand, the court held that the record did not clearly disclose whether the failure to reach the contract depth resulted from lack of a blowout preventer, as urged
by defendant, or from loss of circulation. In either event, how30. Id. at 98.
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ever, the contractor was responsible as he was in breach of his
obligations in both respects.
Defendant's reconventional demand was also denied. The
court noted that the contract contained default procedures which
were available to defendant in the event of breach of the obligations of the contract. However, defendant had not chosen to utilize them but had voluntarily ordered completion at a depth shallower than specified. This action had the effect of annulling the
original contract provisions and precluded recovery for breach
of contract.
WATER RIGHTS

noted elsewhere in this Review, 3 2 raised
Adams v.
the problem of subsurface water rights. The Second Circuit refused to apply the articles of our Civil Code granting landowners the natural servitude of drainage and the right to use running water to an oil operator engaged in authorized water flood
operations causing depletion of the fresh water sand from which
plaintiffs secured their water supply.
Grigsby,81

The decision strongly underscores the need for the legislature to give attention to growing problems involving water
rights. It is predictable that increased urbanization and industrialization will aggravate these problems. Use of foresight now
could avoid a great deal of difficulty in the future.
PUBLIC LANDS

Acquisitive Prescription
The decision rendered in King v. Board of Commissioners
for Atchafalaya Basin Levee District 3 is one of the most significant rendered during the past term. The issue raised was
whether a title perfected by thirty-year acquisitive prescription
against defendant levee district included minerals. In essence,
the holding of this case is that as prescription runs against a
levee board,14 and as the constitutional prohibition against aliena31. 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs denied, 244 La. 662, 153
So. 2d 880 (1963).
32. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 428 (1964).
33. 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writs denied, 244 La. 118, 150
So. 2d 585 (1963). In denying writs the Supreme Court merely stated: "The
result is correct."
34. See Haas v. Board of Commissioners of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou
Boeuf Levee District, 206 La. 378, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944) ; Board of Commissioners
of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929) ; Board
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tion of minerals by the "state"8 5 is inapplicable to such a board
or agency,36 any acquisitive title to lands owned by such an
agency includes the minerals. It is true that the basis for the
prescriptive title to the land in question was established in 1912,
prior to the constitutional prohibition against alienation of minerals, which might serve to distinguish this case from one involving a prescriptive base established after 1921. However, the
decision appears to be extremely far reaching and dangerous.
The fiction of distinguishing between the legal personality
of the "state" and a state agency may have its proper uses. It
has been used to make inroads on the principle that prescription
does not run against the "state" in civil matters.87 However, its
use here does not seem justified. Obviously the makers of the
Constitution intended that no lands owned by the sovereign
should be disposed of in such manner as to alienate the mineral
rights on such lands. The logical conclusion of this decision is
that mineral rights inalienable as long as title to land remains
in the sovereign become alienable upon conveyance of the land
to a state agency. Adherence to this ultimate conclusion could
make a mockery of the constitutional prohibition, and, as noted
by the concurring opinion in this case, 8 seriously endanger the
public interest in mineral development of state lands.
This decision has been thoroughly discussed in a student note
elsewhere in this Review,;89 therefore, no detailed analysis is
necessary. It is hoped that the decision will be reconsidered in
some fashion; at the very least, it should be limited to acquisitive titles the basis for which was established prior to 1921.
Title Controversies with Private Owners
In Walmsley v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp.40 plaintiffs
of Commissioners of Tensas Basin Levee District v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So.
619 (1929); Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. Toyo Kisen
Kaisha, 163 La. 865, 113 So. 127 (1927).
35. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
36. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959).
37. See authorities cited in note 34 supra.
38. King v. Board of Commissioners for Achafalaya Basin Levee District, 148
So. 2d 138, 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). Judge Tate felt that the decision of
the court was correct inasmuch as the basis for the prescriptive title had been
established prior to 1921. However, he dissented strongly insofar as the majority's opinion could be interpreted as holding that the constitutional prohibition
would be inapplicable even though the prescription had commenced subsequent
to 1921.
39. Note, 24 LA. L. REv. 416 (1964).
40. 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963).
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instituted what they designated as an action to remove a cloud
on their title to certain lands in Plaquemines Parish. They alleged title in themselves stemming from a patent granted by the
State of Louisiana in the year 1878. Further, plaintiffs alleged
that the land in question was included in a lease granted defendant by the State Mineral Board on behalf of the State of Louisiana. Having alleged title in themselves, plaintiffs showed that
the State Mineral Board had no authority to execute the lease
and that defendant lessees therefore had no right to claim that
it was valid.
Plaintiffs' petition made no clear and unequivocal allegations
denying possession in themselves, nor were there any allegations
of possession by defendants. It was alleged, however, that "defendants herein are claiming and asserting that the lease is
being maintained in full force and effect by production of oil,
gas and other minerals from the properties owned by petitioners." Plaintiffs reserved all rights to recover for minerals which
may have been removed from the property by defendants and
prayed for judgment decreeing the lease "to be null, void and of
no effect and cancelled and annulled" and "decreeing defendants
. . . have no interest in and to said property by virtue of said
lease."
Defendants filed exceptions of nonjoinder of an indispensable party (the state) and of no cause or right of action, contending that although plaintiffs characterized their action as
one to remove cloud from title, the petition disclosed that defendants were in corporeal possession of the property and that
the action to remove cloud from title was not available to plaintiffs. Thus, it was contended that the petition actually alleged
a petitory action, requiring that the State of Louisiana be joined
as a party.
As stated by the Supreme Court, the issue was said to be
whether the state was an indispensable party to the action. Resolution of this issue was deemed to turn upon whether the action
was indeed a petitory action or, as contended by plaintiffs, an
action to remove a cloud from the plaintiffs' title. After reviewing the allegations of plaintiffs' petition, the court concluded
that the allegations of title were necessary to establish a basis
for plaintiffs' right to have the cloud removed; that the prayer
of plaintiffs' petition sought only that the lease be decreed null,
void and of no effect and that defendants be adjudged to have
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no interest in the disputed property by virtue of the lease; and,
finally, that the allegations by plaintiffs to the effect that defendants claimed the lease to be maintained in force by production related only to plaintiffs' claim that the lease constituted a
cloud on their title..
Conceding arguendo, however, that plaintiffs had alleged
that defendants were in possession, the court nevertheless felt
that the action to remove cloud from title was not foreclosed for
failure to allege possession in defendants. "What is important
is that plaintiffs have not, according to the prayer of the petition, sought a judgment 'recognizing their ownership' as they
must do for their action to be characterized as a petitory action
under Article 3651.'
Justices Sanders and Hawthorne dissented from the opinion
of the majority on the ground that the court's decision extended
the action to remove cloud from title by making it available to
one out of possession as against one in possession of property.
Despite the fact that it has become a cliche, the old maxim
about hard facts making bad law is starkly revealed by this decision as a basic truth. The hard facts in this instance are obvious. Plaintiffs, finding themselves embroiled in a title dispute
with the state, were either unable to secure permission to bring
suit or found the procedures for doing so too awesome a prospect. 42 Thus, they brought this action, perhaps contemplating
that success would give considerable leverage over the state in
ultimately disposing of the basic argument. No matter how appealing the situation of the plaintiffs may have been, the devastating effect of this decision on Louisiana's procedural system,
particularly in view of its recent revision, represents an unjustifiably high price to pay for "practical" justice as between the
particular parties.
The Supreme Court's opinion misconstrues prior decisions
relating to the action to remove a cloud on title and seriously
disrupts the basic system of real actions in the new Code of
Civil Procedure. To begin with, it is essential to bear in mind
that there were two exceptions before the court: (1) the exception of nonjoinder and (2) the exception of no cause. As to the
41. Id. at 513, 153 So. 2d at 379.
42. It should be noted that plaintiffs could have negotiated with the title controversy committee of the Louisiana State Mineral Board concerning their claim.
Apparently, however, they chose to assert this action.
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exception of nonjoinder, there is some logic in accepting the
prayer of plaintiffs' petition as governing; the prayer did not
seek an adjudication of title. Therefore, by plaintiffs' own election, the action could be treated as one to remove a cloud from
title. Although the writer has some reservations even about
this possible holding, it could nevertheless be supported in the
light of our jurisprudence.
The exception of no cause of action, however, does not turn
solely on the prayer in plaintiffs' petition, which appeared to be
persuasive to the court. In considering this exception two facets
of the opinion should be analyzed. First, one must view the
court's determination that plaintiffs' allegation that defendants
contended the lease had been maintained in force by production
constituted no more than an allegation of the "slander." It is
felt that this sort of highly technical construction of pleadings
is in obvious disregard of the truth as revealed by plaintiffs'
petition. It revives the sort of technical rules of pleading which,
it had been assumed by many, were discarded in this state years
ago. Such highly technical construction gives undue recognition
to what is vulgarly known as "weasel-wording." Even this holding might have been bearable, however, for if not raised by the
petition, at least the legal issue of possession and its impact upon
the litigation might still have been raised by defendants. But
the court extended its decision when it stated that even conceding plaintiffs had alleged that defendants were in possession, it
did not feel that the action was foreclosed "for failure to allege
possession in plaintiff or because of an allegation of possession
in defendant."
The latter holding is not in accord with prior jurisprudence.
One of the cases cited by the Supreme Court as evidence of the
vitality of the action to remove cloud on title, Exchange National
Bank of Shreveport v. Head,43 clearly defines the role of possession in the action to quiet title in Louisiana. Plaintiff had
failed to allege possession in either itself or defendant. The
court held that this failure did not necessarily warrant sustaining an exception of no cause of action. For the purpose of that
particular exception plaintiff was to be regarded as owner and
possessor, but even a plaintiff not in actual possession might
'44
have an action to quiet title against a party "out of possession.
13. 155 La. 309, 99 So. 272 (1924).
44. "For the purpose of this phase of the exception, the plaintiff must be
regarded as the owner and possessor of the land, and there can be no possession
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Similar language is found in Atchafalaya Land Co. v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co. where it was stated that although a plaintiff
not in possession could not bring a jactitory action, he could
"bring a suit against another party equally out of possession to
procure the cancellation of a title which that other party may
have caused to be recorded against the property. ' 45 A clear implication of these and other decisions considering the nature of
the action to quiet title in Louisiana is that the action is available only as against a defendant not in possession. If this were
not true, it would entirely destroy, as the principal case may,
the role played by possession in our procedure. To hold otherwise denies to the possessor of land the presumption of title
granted him by our codified law. Acknowledgment of this truth
is found in Griffon v. Blanc :41
"But where the defendant is actually in possession, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to change his position with the form
of action and escape the burden imposed upon him by Art.
44, C.P. In order to recover and turn his adversary out of
possession he must establish his title."
As authority for its decision the Supreme Court relied on
Daigle v. Pan American Production Co.4 7 That decision, however, is clearly not authority for the proposition cited. It is true
that the court there stated that "possession is not necessary in
either plaintiff or defendant."4 8 However, that statement should
be analyzed in the light of the pleadings before the court, in
which plaintiff had categorically alleged that neither she nor
defendants were in possession of the property in question. Thus,
the court merely stated that in situations where neither party
is in possession, the action is available. Any words going beyond
the factual allegations presented in the Daigle case should be
viewed as dictum. Finally, it is to be noted that prior to submission of that case to the Supreme Court, the Louisiana State Mineral Board filed in the record a release and cancellation of the
offending mineral lease. Thus, in actuality, any issue of whether
of the land in the defendant under the oil lease separate and distinct from and
to the exclusion of the owner of the land.
"But even where the plaintiff, claiming ownership, is not in actual possession
of the property, he may yet have his action against a party out of possession for
the cancellation of the recorded deed, and to remove the cloud on his title." Id.
at 313, 99 So. at 273-74.
45. 130 La. 657, 660, 58 So. 500, 501 (1912).
46. 12 La. Ann. 5, 6 (1857).
47. 236 La. 578, 108 So. 2d 516 (1958).
48. Id. at 518.
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the petition alleged a cause of action to quiet title became moot
upon expiration of the lease and its cancellation from the public
records.
As noted, the principal difficulty with the Walmsley decision
is its destruction of the presumption of ownership given to the
possessor of land. If this dispute had occurred among private
parties, our real actions would have afforded plaintiffs a remedy
in any conceivable factual situation. One in possession of land,
or recently evicted, may protect his bare possession by assertion
of the possessory action, 49 and, as a result of the merger of
the old possessory and jactitory actions, may have the court
order the defendant to assert his claim or be precluded thereafter from doing so. One out of possession, as were plaintiffs
in this instance, may assert his claim of ownership through the
new petitory action,50 which combines the old petitory action
and the statutory action to establish title, either against a defendant in possession or out of possession.
To hold, as in the principal case, that the possessor of land,
here the agent of one claiming legal title, may not even raise
the issue of his possession and take advantage of the presumption given to the possession by law does extreme violence to
our system of real actions. Saying that the decision rendered in
the Walmsley case does not involve an adjudication of title approaches sophistry. All of the rights exercised by defendants,
the State Mineral Board and its lessees, are derived from and
dependent upon the title of the State of Louisiana, and the Mineral Board is the agent of the state, standing in its stead. To
hold that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment it must be determined that they have title to the property.
It is worthy of observation that saying that there is no question of title involved here is not the same as making that statement with regard to a jactitory (possessory) action. In the
latter type of action, evidence of title is admissible to prove
nature and extent of possession. 51 But the action involves, and
the court can protect, only the plaintiff's possession- which
52
gives the presumption of ownership.
The very nature of the action to quiet title is, however, pro49. LA. CODE

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

50. Id. arts. 3651-3653.
51. Id. art. 3661.
52. Id. art. 3662.

arts. 3655-3662 (1960).
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tection of title. Therefore, the case cannot be decided without
adjudication of plaintiff's claim of title. The court, of course,
recognized that no judgment issued by it on the issue of title
would be binding upon the State of Louisiana. That being true,
the decision promotes multiplicity of litigation. It will now be
necessary for the state to institute litigation to protect its title,
or at least possible for it to do so, and the identical issue of title
will have to be relitigated.
The inappropriateness to our system of the action to quiet
title is clearly revealed by a brief examination of its historical
origins. The action originated in equity. In some of the law
courts in England relitigation of certain questions was possible.
Actions of ejectment, which became the usual mode of trying
title, were at one time among these. To put an end to oppressive
relitigation practices, chancery interfered on behalf of those
successful in establishing their legal titles in prior actions of
ejectment. As a prerequisite to the right to maintain a bill to
quiet title, it was, of course, necessary that the complainant have
had title adjudicated to him at law.53 Thus, the issue of legal
title was settled before a complainant could seek relief from a
court of equity. The inconsistency with the situation under discussion is obvious.
Abolition of the action to quiet title or remove a cloud from
title in Louisiana was suggested prior to enactment of the
present Code of Civil Procedure. 54 According to the introductory note to Title II of Book VII of the new code, however,
abolition was not contemplated in the drafting and passage of
the new code.
As a result of the Walmsley decision it is suggested that two
remedial legislative actions should be considered. First, the
action to quiet title or to remove cloud from title should be
formally abolished. Under ordinary circumstances in suits between private citizens there is no conceivable need for the action, as the real actions permit relief in every instance where
a plaintiff can demonstrate himself to be entitled to it. Second,
citizens having title controversies with the state may very well
be in need of special relief which will permit them to obtain
judicial settlement without waiting for the state to bring suit.
53. See PoMEuoY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 248 (5th ed. 1941).
54. Zengel, The Real Actions-Study in Code Revision, 29 TUL. L. REv. 617,
634 n. 59 (1955).
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It is true that the Title Controversy Committee of the Louisiana
State Mineral Board affords some measure of relief. But negotiations with that body may be unsuccessful, or at least unsatisfactory, and for the ordinary individual claiming title adversely
to the state the problems of securing authorization to bring suit
may prove insurmountable in such circumstances.
The Walmsley decision appears to be a compassionate response to the plight of citizens with title claims against the state.
The court could limit the damage done to the concepts underlying our system of real actions by restricting it to similar situations involving controversy with the state as in other cases
litigants have remedies available through the real actions. However, remedial legislation seems preferable.

INSURANCE
G. Frank Purvis, Jr.
The great volume of insurance litigation considered by the
Louisiana appellate courts in past years continued during the
1962-1963 term. Over one hundred decisions of our appellate
courts were rendered during that time. Those of most general
interest and significance are reviewed in these comments. The
Supreme Court rendered only two of the decisions, a rather unusual fact in view of the large number of decisions.
I.

LIFE COVERAGES

In the field of life insurance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal applied the usual rule in holding that the wife forfeits her
rights as the beneficiary of the policy of life insurance on the
life of her husband when she feloniously kills him and the insurance proceeds then become the property of the insured's estate.
As such the proceeds are property of the decedent's separate
estate and are not community property. In the opinion of the
court, it would be illogical and against public policy to hold that
the wife, denied recovery personally for feloniously killing her
husband, yet could recover half of the proceeds as her community interest. The only interest a wife could have, the court
says, would be the recovery from her husband's estate of half

